El novelón por el Reporte desechado está muy bueno!

En una columna escrita para The Wall Street Journal, el profesor George L. Priest, de la Universidad de Yale, se despacha contra la actitud del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos que se materializó en el discurso de la señora Christine Varney del pasado 11 de mayo. Como recordarán, la señora Varney anunció oficilmente el retiro del reporte elaborado por el Departamento de Justicia (DOJ) en la administración Bush sobre el análisis de la conducta unilateral bajo la sección segunda del Sherman Act (véase anterior post).

Pues bien, quienes están interesados en antitrust y en law and economics saben muy bien que G. Priest es un peso pesado en dichas materias. De manera que recibir un "viajao" del Priest no es cualquier cosa. Antes de comentar las "cargas de profundidad" lanzadas por Priest en su columna titulada "The Justice Department's Antitrust Bomb", vale la pena advertir que en el trasfondo de la discusión gira en torno a la ideología política y su incidencia en el diseño y aplicación de las políticas de competencia. Detrás del giro de la administración Obama en relación al enforcement de las normas de libre competencia y de la reacción de académicos como Priest que califican la postura del de DOJ como una "bomba para el derecho antitrust moderno" hay una posición respecto del papel del Estado en la economía y un juicio de valor sobre la tensión entre el bienestar de los consumidores y el bienestar de los productores.

No es un hecho histórico que una administración Republicana tenderá a enfocarse en los casos de carteles duros y a relajar el estándar de prohibición de integraciones empresariales, mientras que una administración Demócrata será más estricta respecto de la conducta de empresas que tienen poder de mercado y respecto del control de integraciones.

Ahora sí revisemos los sablazos de Priest para Varney:

1. Priest critica la idea de Varney según la cual una de las causas de la crisis financiera fue la manera como se aplicaron las normas antimonopolio (o mejor, su falta de aplicación)durante la administración Bush. Además, según Priest, en el discurso de Varney no hay una argumentación razonada para llegar a dicha conclusión.
2. En relación con la postura expuesta por Varney respecto del reporte de 2008 del DOJ (en el cual se hacen recomendaciones sobre la conducta monopolizadora) Priest advierte que el reporte fue producto de un año de trabajo que tuvo en cuenta las recomendaciones de 29 páneles y 119 testigos que en últimas recoge las sub-reglas creadas por la Corte Suprema de Justicia.
3. Adicionalmente, Priest critica que Varney la ausencia de una alternativa comprensiva a las recomendaciones del reporte retirado y la referencia a la postura de la Unión Europea. Evidentemente, si en algo se distingue la doctrina de las jurisidicciones es su aproximación a las conductas de empresas con posición de dominio y respecto de las restricciones verticales (especialmente respecto de exclusividades y políticas de fidelización).
4. Continuará... (Gracias a J. C. Esguerra por la alerta temprana!)

Obamantitrust!: Retiro del informe sobre sobre Conducta Unilateral

El Presidente Obama ya había advertido (véase la declaración "Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust Institute") su inconformidad por el enfoque de la aplicación de las normas antitrust durante la Administración Bush durante las elecciones de 2008:

"Regrettably, the current administration has what may be the weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half century. Between 1996 and 2000, the FTC and DOJ together challenged on average more than 70 mergersper year on the grounds that they would harm consumer welfare. In contrast, between 2001 and 2006, the FTC and DOJ on average only challenged 33. And in seven years, the Bush Justice Department has not brought a single monopolization case." (negrillas e itálicas fuera de texto)

Pues bien, en el día de hoy Christine A. Varney, la asistente al Attorney General del DOJ de EEUU (véase comunicado de prensa y véase reseña del NY Times) anunció que se retiraría el Reporte que había publicado la Divisón Antitrust del DOJ en septiembre de 2008 sobre conducta unilateral excluyente y la aplicación de la sección segunda del Sherman Act (Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act). Varney hace una exposición histórica de la aplicación de las normas antimonopolio en EEUU y propone una analogía con lo sucedido durante la recesión de los años treinta a propósito de la crisis actual. Según Varney el relajamiento de la aplicación de las normas durante la Gran Depresión fue un gran error que no debe repetirse. Asimismo, señala que la Administración Bush perdió el norte al dejar un lado el principal objetivo de las normas: el bienestar del consumidorl. Por lo tanto, en sintonía con el título del discurso "Vigorous antitrust enforcement in this challenging era", Varney promete la utilización de un estándar rigoroso con énfasis en el impacto de las conductas unilaterales que excluyan a competidores y consumidores.

No se debe dejar de lado lo siguiente: en septiembre del año pasado varios comisionados del FTC (véase declaración de Pamela Jones Harbour, Jon Leibowitz, y J. Thomas Rosch) habían reaccionado en contra del informe (véase comunicado de prensa) y de su adopción como criterio para el enforcement y para las mismas cortes por considerarlo un debilitamiento a la aplicación de la normativa. En segundo lugar, el comisionado William E. Kovacic también se refirió al reporte en un tono diferente al de sus colegas pues agradeció el esfuerzo empeñado en su elaboración.

Recomiendo la lectura del discurso que puede ser consultado en el siguiente enlace: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/05/12/business/VarneySpeech.pdf

Para ser muy francos el novelón sobre la evaluación de la conducta exlcuyente tiene un ingrediente adicional respecto de la Unión Europea que lo pone más sabor: la Comunicación de la Comisión Europea "Orientaciones sobre las prioridades de control de la Comisión en su aplicación del artículo 82 del Tratado CE a la conducta excluyente abusiva de las empresas dominantes".

Tres ensayos sobre poder de mercado y abuso de posición de dominio

Barry E. Hawk de Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP acaba de subir al SSRN tres ensayos sobre poder de mercado y abuso de posición de dominio. Transcribo abajo los datos pertinentes de los documentos:

• "Article 82 and Section 2: Abuse and Monopolizing Conduct" (publicado Issues of Competition Law and Policy, Vol. 2, p. 871, 2008 / Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301690), Abstract: Differing historical contexts, such as the greater role of public companies and state-created monopolies in the EU, differing policy considerations such as the EU's traditional embrace of fairness, and differing underlying economic and juridical assumptions about, among others, market erosion and the capability of authorities and courts to identify and remedy anticompetitive conduct, all explain the traditionally broader scope of Article 82 compared with Section 2. However, the EU's increasing acceptance of mainstream economics, welfare analysis and an effects-oriented inquiry, together with the declining influence of the Ordoliberals, should narrow (but not eliminate) the present gap between Section 2 and Article 82.

• "The Current Debate About Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Judicial Certainty Versus Rule of Reason " (II Lisbon Conference on Law and Economics / Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper). Abstract: This paper discusses whether section 2 has generated too much legal uncertainty (i.e., ex ante unpredictability) and, if so, how legal certainty can be increased. U.S. commentators and businesses have complained vociferously about the lack of predictable rules governing unlawful monopolization under section 2. Uncertainty is compounded by the use of juries where instructions have been severely criticized as not providing sufficient guidance to the lay members. A principal basis for concluding that uncertainty is a serious business problem is the intuition that enforcement of section 2 is chilling procompetitive (and consumer welfare enhancing) behavior like investment into and introduction of innovative products and services. There are numerous assertions to this effect but unfortunately few specific concrete examples have been offered. There appear to be few to no empirical studies that offer solid facts to provide a confident answer. However, the risk of a section 2 chilling effect on procompetitive business decisions and the potential for section 2 mischief is sufficient to warrant careful consideration of legal uncertainty even without detailed comprehensive empirical work. To increase legal certainty, assumptions and policy objectives should be reflected in specific clear legal rules as the Supreme Court did in Trinko when fashioning the rule on refusing to grant access to rivals. But this is certainly not always the case and the non-transparency of assumptions and policy objectives considerably lessens legal certainty under section 2 (and Article 82).

• "Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem", Barry E. Hawk Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP y Giorgio A. Motta Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law, Eighth Edition / Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301693) Abstract: This paper discusses the doctrine of collective dominance under Article 82 of the EC Treaty in the context of oligopolies. Section I discusses the essentially economics oligopoly problem defined here as the extent of subcompetitive performance (e.g., higher prices, lower output, lesser quality, etc.) resulting from interdependence among rivals. Sections II and III respectively discuss two competition law (essentially legal) concerns largely from a U.S. perspective: the oligopoly gap (concern that any subcompetitive performance cannot adequately be addressed by legal prohibitions of abusive/monopolistic unilateral conduct (e.g., Article 82 or section 2 of the Sherman Act)) and the unproved cartel gap (concern that oligopolies provide an environment in which cartels succeed without proof of the legal requisite agreement or concert e.g., Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Article 81) or section 1)). Section IV discusses Article 82 and collective dominance in the oligopoly context, particularly to what extent, if any, collective dominance has been used to address either the oligopoly gap or the unproved cartel gap. Section V discusses several Member State judgments applying collective dominance to oligopolies.

Dos ensayos de Susan Beth Farmer

La última edición del Penn State Dickinson School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series distribuido por el SSRN contiene papers exclusivamente sobre derecho de la comptencia. Por ser de interés, destaco dos documentos de Susan Beth Farmer sobre: i) las implicaciones de la aplicación de legislaciones de libre competencia a nivel global (previamente publicado en Carolina Academic Press, 2007) y ii) la historia de la aplicación de las normas antitrust en los Estados de EEUU con énfasis en el aspecto criminal (previamente publicado en State Antitrust Enforcement Handbook (ABA Section of Antitrust Law), 2003).

Abajo los vínculos e información pertinente:

• Chapter 9 - Global Competition Implications for Enforcement
  Susan Beth Farmer, Pennsylvania State University - Dickinson School of Law

"This paper proceeds from the perspective that the engines of vigorous competition promote development and provide economic and social benefits to consumers and firms and, if markets are subverted by private cartels, law enforcement is necessary to protect consumer welfare. For consumers and corporations alike, much modern trade is conducted with little regard for national borders. The ease of communication, commerce and travel that facilitates international business, however, also increases the risk that anticompetitive behavior will cause harm to consumers and competition in more than one jurisdiction. Thus, modern competition lawyers must counsel their clients in an environment where business is conducted across borders and restraints of trade cause harm internationally and national competition laws can be enforced extraterritorially. Whilst purely domestic commercial activity is plausible, its effect on the global market is arguably virtually de minimis.
Since commercial activity in one jurisdiction likely affects other states, legal actors and systems must communicate effectively with each other when adopting and enforcing laws that have multi-national impact. Importantly, legislators and law enforcement officials are already cooperating and competition law is undergoing a process of consolidation and harmonization. On one level, the issues raised by global competition enforcement are purely instrumental: a function of ascertaining whether are there differences in substance or procedure that matter, identifying these areas of divergence, evaluating their significance, and deciding whether and how they should they be resolved and by whom. On a non-utilitarian, non-pragmatic level, it is also important to identify the theoretical bases for any divergences among competition laws and enforcement regimes and to inquire whether such laws and enforcement priorities should be harmonized, and evaluate the justifications for harmonization. There is real value, but also a real cost, in the existence of multiple enforcement agencies. Even though most substantive provisions of competition laws are largely consistent, there have been examples of conflicts, most problematic in major merger cases because the costs of divergence are most acute. However, the potential costs are significant and should be minimized to the greatest extent possible to facilitate global competition while protecting consumers and competition from multinational cartels, restrictive agreements, and monopolies. Vigorous competition is a powerful route to improving the economic and social condition of citizens by allowing them to participate in a fair market economy. The current 90 jurisdictions that have adopted and are enforcing their own competition laws offer the benefits of competition for their citizens and firms doing business in these states. However, since these numerous competition laws may have differing underlying goals, substantive standards, and procedures, there are inefficiencies and costs to firms seeking to compete in multiple jurisdictions. This paper articulates a standard to evaluate whether a particular resolution to inconsistent global enforcement is recommended. Any such model for minimizing conflicts must further the values of competition law and enforcement and reserve sufficient discretion for individual sovereign states to effectuate their own legitimate competitive goals and evaluate the effect of cartels on their own consumers and competitive processes. I argue that the characteristics of such a model system include the following: competition law or laws, and their enforcement regimes, should be predictable, transparent, efficient, non-discriminatory in application, and legitimate or credible. At this time, a supra-national enforcement agency that pre-empts state competition laws and enforcement not is not likely to achieve these goals. Whilst substantive uniformity on core issues is plausible, agreement on non-core issues and underlying norms unlikely to be achieved. Moreover, differences in enforcement priorities and expertise make a uniform law an unappealing option.
Voluntary cooperation, consultation and soft harmonization among state competition agencies offers the most promise. Harmonization, especially if the consultative process includes representatives of diverse interests including consumers, is efficient, transparent and credible. To the extent that agreement on core principles and processes is achieved, enforcement will be more predictable and fair."

• State Criminal Antitrust Enforcement
  Susan Beth Farmer, Pennsylvania State University - Dickinson School of Law

"This chapter recounts the history and modern status of state antitrust enforcement. Initially, it describes the three major waves of state statutory enactments, one before 1900, one during the 1930's and the final in the 1970's, and culminates with an analysis of recent legislative developments. A total of 47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted various criminal penalties. The chapter reviews actual patterns of criminal antitrust litigation by State Attorneys General, assesses their effectiveness and analyzes likely future patterns of enforcement activity."

Derecho de la Competencia de la UE, España y EEUU

El doctor Doctor Francisco Marcos, Profesor del IE Law School y Director del Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia (Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia de España) amablemente me ha remitido tres recientes documentos de su autoría que cubren diversos temas y que recomiendo descargar (tengan paciencia con los links!).

1. "¿Hacia una reformulación del Derecho de Defensa de la Competencia por el Tribunal Supremo Norteamericano?"

Por: Francisco Marcos

"Palabras clave: Derecho de Defensa de la Competencia, Tribunal Supremo Norteamericano, Restricciones Verticales, Compras predatorias, regulación del mercado de valores"

2. "Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonizing Tort Law through the Back Door?"

Por: Francisco Marcos y Albert Sánchez

"Abstract: Tort law is not harmonized at the European level. Both substantive and procedural regulations vary substantially across EU Member States. Such regulatory diversity is inevitably refl ected in the fi eld of antitrust private enforcement – based on claims for damages infl icted as a result of anticompetitive behaviour, which the European Commission has been strongly encouraging since 2003. A Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules was published in December 2005 with the purpose of opening up a reform process aimed at facilitating private damages actions across the EU. The Green Paper put forward most of the divergences in national tort law and civil procedure regulations that jeopardize the effectiveness of a privately enforced competition system. These differences in national regulations are in contrast with the nearly full de-facto harmonization existing in antitrust law and its public enforcement. To fill this (perceived) gap, the Commission came up with harmonization proposals that imply deep reforms in national tort law and civil procedure regulations. Those proposals are to be developed and further analyzed in a forthcoming White Paper – initially foreseen to be adopted around the turn of the year 2007, now expected in 2008. This paper analyzes the need and adequacy of the harmonization alternatives put forward by the Commissionand wonders whether its efforts for the harmonization of antitrust damages actions constitute a ‘backdoor harmonization’ of fundamental aspects of tort law and civilprocedure regulations with much broader implications and effects in fields of law other than antitrust."

3. El tratamiento de las restricciones públicas a la competencia: La exención legal en la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia".

Por: Francisco Marcos

"Resumen: La exención de la aplicación de la prohibición de conductas y prácticas restrictivas de la competencia cuando se hallen amparadas en normas de rango legal se recoge en la nueva Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia en términos parecidos al Derecho previgente. El precepto que la Ley dedica a esta cuestión (art. 4) mejora en su calidad técnica, al ampliar su ámbito de aplicación a todas las prohibiciones de conductas restrictivas de la competencia, incluyendo el abuso de posición dominante y falseamiento de la libre competencia por actos desleales. Además, excluye de la exención a las conductas anticompetitivas que no se encuentren amparadas por normas de rango legal o que se deriven de la actuación de la Administración pública, así como las actuaciones de las empresas públicas restrictivas de la competencia que carezcan de amparo legal. Finalmente, la disposición legal mantiene una inadecuada e innecesaria referencia a la aplicación del Derecho comunitario incorporada en 1999 que, llevada a sus últimas consecuencias, cuestiona la teoría de la “doble barrera” y la propia existencia y sentido de la legislación española de defensa de la competencia.

Desde otra perspectiva debe subrayarse que la LDC sienta las bases para corregir los errores que en la praxis previa del TDC se habían cometido en la lucha contra las normas y actos administrativos que, sin amparo legal, introducían restricciones a la competencia. En efecto, la CNC y las autoridades autonómicas no pueden inaplicar o declarar la nulidad de esos actos y reglamentos y deberán acudir a su impugnación ante la jurisdicción competente (art. 13.2).

Palabras clave: Defensa de la competencia, Restricciones públicas a la competencia, Prohibiciones antitrust, amparo legal, acto administrativo.

Descuentos, Exclusividad y Fidelización

EINER ELHAUGE publicó recientmente el ensayo "Loyalty Discounts and Naked Exclusion" (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 608). Se trata de un interesante documento sobre los descuentos otorgados por empresas a cambio de exclusividad y sus efectos sobre la competencia.

A continuación trascribo la información relevante del documento

"Abstract: Loyalty discounts are agreements to sell at a lower price to buyers who buy all or most of their purchases from the seller. This article proves that loyalty discounts create anticompetitive effects, not only because they can impair rival efficiency, but because loyalty discounts perversely discourage discounting even when they have no effect on rival efficiency. The essential reason, missed in prior work, is that firms using loyalty discounts have less incentive to compete for free buyers, because any price reduction to win sales to free buyers will, given the loyalty discount, also lower prices to loyal buyers. This in turn reduces the incentive of rivals to cut prices, because there will exist an above-cost price that rivals can charge to free buyers without being undercut by the firm using loyalty discounts. These anticompetitive effects occur even if buyers can breach or terminate commitments, and even if the loyalty conditions require no contractual commitments and less than 100% loyalty. Further, I prove that these anticompetitive effects are exacerbated if multiple sellers use loyalty discounts. None of the results depend on switching costs, market differentiation, imperfect competition, or the loyalty discount bundling contestable and incontestable demand. Contrary to commonly held views, I prove these anticompetitive effects exist even when: (1) the price with the loyalty discount is above cost, (2) the rival has higher costs than the firm using loyalty discounts, (3) the rival prices above its own costs, (4) buyers voluntarily agree to the conditions, and (5) the discount and foreclosure levels are low. I derive formulas for calculating the inflated price levels in each situation.

Keywords: Loyalty Discounts, Fidelity Rebates, Conditional Discounts, Market-Share Discounts, Naked Exclusion, Exclusionary, Exclusive Dealing, Antitrust, Foreclosure, Cumulative Foreclosure, Aggregate Foreclosure, Equally Effiient Rival, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, Anticompetitive

JEL Classifications: C72, K21, L12, L40, L41, L42"

El control de concentraciones en EEUU

Los profesores JONATHAN B. BAKER y CARL SHAPIRO publicaron un interesante documento, "Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement", sobre la reciente evolución de los criterios usados por las agencias de Estados Unidos para estudiar concentraciones empresariales. Los autores señalan que el control de las concentraciones, especialmente en relación al Departamento de Justicia, está declinando y proponen un viraje hacia un estudio basado en la estructura de mercado.

Transcribo a continuación el abstract:

"The past forty years have witnessed a remarkable transformation in horizontal merger enforcement in the United States. With no change in the underlying statute, the Clayton Act, the weight given to market concentration by the federal courts and by the federal antitrust agencies has declined dramatically. Instead, increasing weight has been given to three arguments often made by merging firms in their defense: entry, expansion and efficiencies. We document this shift and provide examples where courts have approved highly concentrating mergers based on limited evidence of entry and expansion. We show using merger enforcement data and a survey we conducted of merger practitioners that the decline in antitrust enforcement is ongoing, especially at the current Justice Department. We then argue in favor of reinvigorating horizontal merger enforcement by partially restoring the structural presumption and by requiring strong evidence to overcome the government’s prima facie case. We propose several routes by which the government can establish its prima facie case, distinguishing between cases involving coordinated vs. unilateral anti-competitive effects."

Precios mínimos para reventa y la controversia causda por Leegin

A finales del año pasado la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Estados Unidos falló el caso Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) y dejó sin efecto el precedente establecido por casi un siglo en el caso Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911) en virtud del cual la fijación de precios mínimos para la reventa (retail price maintenance) era considerada una conducta ilegal per se por contravenir la sección 1 del Sherman Act. Desde entonces la doctrina ha producido abundante material que analiza los efectos de la decisión de la Corte Suprema que establece que las restricciones verticales de precios serán juzgados bajo la regla de la razonabilidad.

En el caso fallado la compañía Leegin se negó a vender sus productos a la firma PSKS, Inc. pues esta última revendía los productos por debajo de los precios sugeridos de Leegin. PSKS demandó a Leegin alegando, entre otros, que Leegin había realizado acuerdos verticales de precios con sus minoristas para fijar precios mínimos de reventa.

La Corte concluye que recientes estudios muestran que los acuerdos verticales, incluyendo los precios para la reventa, pueden tener efectos pro-competitivos. Cita como ejemplo el potencial de los acuerdos para incentivar la competencia entre-marcas (inter-brand). A pesar de que la Corte reconoce que existe el riesgo de que dichos acuerdos también tengan efectos restrictivos, , la Corte dispone que estas conductas no se ajustan a la categoría de las prohibiciones per se en la medida en que no puede afirmarse con certeza que siempre o casi siempre la fijación de precios mínimos para la reventa restringen la competencia y disminuyen la producción.

Las críticas han llegado desde diversos sectores. LANCE MCMILLIAN (John Marshall Law School - Atlanta) por ejemplo critica la decisión de la Corte desde el punto de vista de la teoría del estado pues afirma en su paper The Proper Role of Courts: Why the Supreme Court Got it Wrong in Leegin que la Corte violó el principio de separación de poderes en la medida en que el Congreso había acogido expresamente el precedente de Dr. Miles al expedir el Consumer Goods Pricing Act de1975 que considera ilegales los acuerdos de precios verticales.

En relación a la perspectiva europea, un buen artículo para conocer el enfoque que la UE le ha dado al tema de los acuerdos verticales es Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC (2007) de Ioannis Lianos (University College London - Faculty of Laws). Están por verse los efectos de este giro en el antitrust de Estados Unidos sobre las demás jurisdicciones del Mundo. Por lo pronto, recomiendo para la mayor comprensión de este polémico tema el ensayo Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The Strange Career of the Law of Resale Price Maintenance de LINO A. GRAGLIA (University of Texas at Austin School of Law ) en la cual se hace un detallado recuento del análisis de la fijación de precios para la reventa en Estados Unidos.

Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence

MARK A. LEMLEY de Stanford Law School y CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE de Chicago-Kent College of Law han publicado el borrador del documento "Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence" (Noviembre 2007) que hace un recuento de más de cien años de jurisprudencia del antitrust en Estados Unidos. A continuación trascribo el resumen del mismo:

"Abstract: Legal doctrines vary in the extent to which they apply either detailed, categorical rules or broad, open-ended standards that allow for case-specific adjudication. Antitrust law is generally thought of as inhabiting the standards end of this spectrum. In fact, however, despite the generality of the enabling statutes antitrust law is rife with categorical distinctions. In Part I, we explore not only the well-known distinction between conduct that is per se illegal and conduct judged under the rule of reason, but also a number of categorical distinctions the courts draw, either to help delineate the scope of the per se rule or to create distinctions within the scope of the rule of reason itself. By and large these rules don't come from the antitrust statutes. They are created by courts, who are in effect converting case-specific standards en masse into categorical rules.In Part II, we identify a number of problems with these distinctions. One problem is administrative: courts spend a great deal of time trying to parse conduct in order to put it on one side or another of the lines they have created. Indeed, in many cases courts spend more time on categorization than they do on actual economic analysis of the case itself. Second, judicial antitrust categories are subject to manipulation. Parties go to great lengths to fit into a box that will give them more favorable treatment, sometimes by legal argument, sometimes by restructuring a transaction, and sometimes by concealing or misrepresenting the facts of that transaction. Third, a number of the categories the courts have created make no sense, whether because they have lost their meaning over time, because their boundaries have eroded, because they actually tell us very little of relevance to the competitive effects of the transaction, or because they are simply dumb. The net result is a mess. Categories have become conclusions, displacing the fact-specific economic analysis in which antitrust law is supposed to be engaging.In Part III, we argue that there is a better way. We evaluate the costs and benefits of the judicial creation of categories, and contend that the complex of antitrust boxes the courts have created today does more harm than good. We don't mean to suggest there is no value to categories, and that everything must be thrown into a pure cost-benefit analysis. Some rules (the per se rule against price fixing, for instance) make sense. Rather, the important thing is to make sure that the categories we use have empirical support, and that they are communicating valuable information to courts about the competitive effects of a general practice. We think the courts have gone too far in the creation of rules in a variety of cases. Finally, we suggest that courts make more use than they do of certain tools – the doctrine of direct economic effect and empirical evidence – as powerful filters for distinguishing good from bad antitrust claims."

Expert Economic Testimony, Economic Evidence and Asymmetry of Information in Antitrust Cases

He publicado mi tesis de maestría "Expert Economic Testimony, Economic Evidence and Asymmetry of Information in Antitrust Cases" en el SSRN. El documento se enfoca en las normas de la Comunidad Europea y de Estados Unidos (a nivel federal) pero espero escribir próximamente un documento en el cual se refleje el mismo debate en relación al sistema de promoción y defensa de la Competencia de Colombia y en general de América Latina y el Caribe.
Espero sus comentarios!

Ver documento en: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023494

A continuación transcribo los datos relevantes del documento:

ABSTRACT: The objective of this document is to assess two questions that have a positive and normative nature respectively: 1) What incentives does the legal and institutional framework of the European Community (EC) and the United States (federal level) provide to the different agents involved in antitrust proceedings in regards to the use of expert economic testimonies? 2) What legal and social norms could provide appropriate incentives to the different agents involved in antitrust proceedings in order to align the use of expert economic testimonies with antitrust enforcement goals?

To answer the first research question and prepare the settings for the answer of the second question, the nature of the economic expertise applied in antitrust proceedings, its inherent difficulties (section 2), and the legal and institutional framework applied to them (section 3) are presented in detail.

Secondly, a general exposition of the problems posed by asymmetric information in theory (section 4.1) and concerning the relation between the adjudicator and the economic expert (section 4.2) is made, in order lay the foundations to identify the different factors that determine the incentives of the various “actors” in the proceedings (section 4.3). Finally, to answer the second research question, the regulatory and non-regulatory features of US and EC enforcement systems are analyzed to identify which factors mitigate the information asymmetry problems. The different alternatives are presented in three different categories, namely, “evidentiary rules”, “procedural rules and institutional design” and “a market for experts and the academic community” (section 4.4).

The document contains six conclusions that may be summarized in the following statement: regarding expert economic testimonies, an antitrust enforcement system must aim at the minimization of its costs through the mitigation of the consequences of asymmetric information between the adjudicator and the expert. Therefore a cost-benefit analysis of the use of expert witnesses must take into account the incentives produced by the interaction among the different regulatory and non-regulatory features of the antitrust enforcement system.