Nuevas guías de la Comisión Europea sobre el procedimiento antimonopolio

La Dirección General de Competencia ha publicado tres documentos en los que explica detalladamente algunos aspectos de los procedimientos antimonopolio que lleva la Comisión. Con estas Guías se pretende incrementar el conocimiento y comprensión de los procedimientos que adelanta la entidad, con lo cual se espera aumentar la transparencia y eficiencia de las investigaciones.

Las guías publicadas son las siguientes:

1. Mejores prácticas para los procedimientos antimonopolio ("Best Practices for antitrust proceedings")

2. Directrices sobre los consultores auditores ("Guidance on the role of the Hearing Officers in the context of antitrust proceedings")

3. Mejores prácticas para la presentación de pruebas económicas (Best Practices for the submission of economic evidence")

Además de ser de gran utilidad para los investigados por la Comisión, creo que estas guías resultarán de gran ayuda e ilustración para quienes no están familiarizados con el procedimiento antimonopolio de la Unión Europea.

Aunque ya son aplicadas por la Comisión desde el 6 de enero, es posible enviar comentarios hasta el próximo 3 de marzo.

Introducción a la aplicación de la estadìstica en casos de antitrust (¡acceso gratuito para miembros de autoridades de la competencia!)

El Competition Policy International (CPI) realizará un curso virtual de Introducción a la aplicación de la estadística en casos de antitrust ("An Introduction to Statistics in Antitrust Litigation"). El curso estará a cargo del profesor Michael Salinger (Boston University) a través de la "Plataforma de Educacición Global" del CPI.

El curso inicia el miércoles 21 de enero (abajo transcribo el programa) y consta de cuatro sesiones de una hora de duración. El costo de las cuatro sesiones es de USD$ 129 aunque también es posible registrarse para cada sesión individual (que tienen costo c/u de USD$ 49).

Lo que me parece más destacado del programa es que según informa el blog del profesor Daniel Sokol, el CPI ofrece acceso gratuito para miembros de autoridades la competencia. ¡Así que adelante muchachos, sin pena a registrarse escribiendo a LearningCenter@competitionpolicyinternational.com! (Ahora, recordando a M. Friedman: Is there such a thing as a free antitrust course?).

"This course provides an introduction to the use of expert statistical presentation in antitrust litigation. It will focus on how to use statistical analysis in litigation to organize data and ultimately establish a fact or set of facts. Professor Salinger will demystify esoteric statistical concepts that are crucial to understanding statistical
evidence. Professor Salinger also will address how to prepare and present expert statistical testimony more effectively in court.

In this course, you’ll learn:

* What can (and cannot) be learned from data analysis

* How to work with mathematical models

* Techniques for organizing data: distribution and densities

Professor Salinger’s course has significant professional and practical content for attorneys practicing in the antitrust and competition policy arenas, both domestically and abroad. While the principles covered will be general, the course will be organized around two examples from antitrust: market definition and the effect of a
conspiracy.

Course Schedule:

Session 1: The Objective of Statistics – Wednesday, January 21, 2009 at 12 pm E.S.T.Topics: What can (and cannot) be learned from data analysis, Nature of mathematical modeling, Organizing data: Distributions and Densities

Session 2: Statistics of One Variable – Wednesday, January 28, 2009 at 12 pm E.S.T.Topics: Measures of central tendency, Measures of dispersion, Precision of estimates, Hypothesis tests and statistical significance

Session 3: Statistical Relationship between Two Variables – Wednesday, February 4, 2009 at 12 pm E.S.T.Topics: Scatter plots, Simple regression, Correlation

Session 4: Statistical Relationships among More Than Two Variables – Wednesday, February 11, 2009 at 12 pm E.S.T.Topics: Multiple regression, Meaning of / Controlling for another variable"

Expert Economic Testimony, Economic Evidence and Asymmetry of Information in Antitrust Cases

He publicado mi tesis de maestría "Expert Economic Testimony, Economic Evidence and Asymmetry of Information in Antitrust Cases" en el SSRN. El documento se enfoca en las normas de la Comunidad Europea y de Estados Unidos (a nivel federal) pero espero escribir próximamente un documento en el cual se refleje el mismo debate en relación al sistema de promoción y defensa de la Competencia de Colombia y en general de América Latina y el Caribe.
Espero sus comentarios!

Ver documento en: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023494

A continuación transcribo los datos relevantes del documento:

ABSTRACT: The objective of this document is to assess two questions that have a positive and normative nature respectively: 1) What incentives does the legal and institutional framework of the European Community (EC) and the United States (federal level) provide to the different agents involved in antitrust proceedings in regards to the use of expert economic testimonies? 2) What legal and social norms could provide appropriate incentives to the different agents involved in antitrust proceedings in order to align the use of expert economic testimonies with antitrust enforcement goals?

To answer the first research question and prepare the settings for the answer of the second question, the nature of the economic expertise applied in antitrust proceedings, its inherent difficulties (section 2), and the legal and institutional framework applied to them (section 3) are presented in detail.

Secondly, a general exposition of the problems posed by asymmetric information in theory (section 4.1) and concerning the relation between the adjudicator and the economic expert (section 4.2) is made, in order lay the foundations to identify the different factors that determine the incentives of the various “actors” in the proceedings (section 4.3). Finally, to answer the second research question, the regulatory and non-regulatory features of US and EC enforcement systems are analyzed to identify which factors mitigate the information asymmetry problems. The different alternatives are presented in three different categories, namely, “evidentiary rules”, “procedural rules and institutional design” and “a market for experts and the academic community” (section 4.4).

The document contains six conclusions that may be summarized in the following statement: regarding expert economic testimonies, an antitrust enforcement system must aim at the minimization of its costs through the mitigation of the consequences of asymmetric information between the adjudicator and the expert. Therefore a cost-benefit analysis of the use of expert witnesses must take into account the incentives produced by the interaction among the different regulatory and non-regulatory features of the antitrust enforcement system.