Tres ensayos sobre poder de mercado y abuso de posición de dominio

Barry E. Hawk de Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP acaba de subir al SSRN tres ensayos sobre poder de mercado y abuso de posición de dominio. Transcribo abajo los datos pertinentes de los documentos:

• "Article 82 and Section 2: Abuse and Monopolizing Conduct" (publicado Issues of Competition Law and Policy, Vol. 2, p. 871, 2008 / Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301690), Abstract: Differing historical contexts, such as the greater role of public companies and state-created monopolies in the EU, differing policy considerations such as the EU's traditional embrace of fairness, and differing underlying economic and juridical assumptions about, among others, market erosion and the capability of authorities and courts to identify and remedy anticompetitive conduct, all explain the traditionally broader scope of Article 82 compared with Section 2. However, the EU's increasing acceptance of mainstream economics, welfare analysis and an effects-oriented inquiry, together with the declining influence of the Ordoliberals, should narrow (but not eliminate) the present gap between Section 2 and Article 82.

• "The Current Debate About Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Judicial Certainty Versus Rule of Reason " (II Lisbon Conference on Law and Economics / Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper). Abstract: This paper discusses whether section 2 has generated too much legal uncertainty (i.e., ex ante unpredictability) and, if so, how legal certainty can be increased. U.S. commentators and businesses have complained vociferously about the lack of predictable rules governing unlawful monopolization under section 2. Uncertainty is compounded by the use of juries where instructions have been severely criticized as not providing sufficient guidance to the lay members. A principal basis for concluding that uncertainty is a serious business problem is the intuition that enforcement of section 2 is chilling procompetitive (and consumer welfare enhancing) behavior like investment into and introduction of innovative products and services. There are numerous assertions to this effect but unfortunately few specific concrete examples have been offered. There appear to be few to no empirical studies that offer solid facts to provide a confident answer. However, the risk of a section 2 chilling effect on procompetitive business decisions and the potential for section 2 mischief is sufficient to warrant careful consideration of legal uncertainty even without detailed comprehensive empirical work. To increase legal certainty, assumptions and policy objectives should be reflected in specific clear legal rules as the Supreme Court did in Trinko when fashioning the rule on refusing to grant access to rivals. But this is certainly not always the case and the non-transparency of assumptions and policy objectives considerably lessens legal certainty under section 2 (and Article 82).

• "Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem", Barry E. Hawk Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP y Giorgio A. Motta Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law, Eighth Edition / Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301693) Abstract: This paper discusses the doctrine of collective dominance under Article 82 of the EC Treaty in the context of oligopolies. Section I discusses the essentially economics oligopoly problem defined here as the extent of subcompetitive performance (e.g., higher prices, lower output, lesser quality, etc.) resulting from interdependence among rivals. Sections II and III respectively discuss two competition law (essentially legal) concerns largely from a U.S. perspective: the oligopoly gap (concern that any subcompetitive performance cannot adequately be addressed by legal prohibitions of abusive/monopolistic unilateral conduct (e.g., Article 82 or section 2 of the Sherman Act)) and the unproved cartel gap (concern that oligopolies provide an environment in which cartels succeed without proof of the legal requisite agreement or concert e.g., Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Article 81) or section 1)). Section IV discusses Article 82 and collective dominance in the oligopoly context, particularly to what extent, if any, collective dominance has been used to address either the oligopoly gap or the unproved cartel gap. Section V discusses several Member State judgments applying collective dominance to oligopolies.

Precios mínimos para reventa y la controversia causda por Leegin

A finales del año pasado la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Estados Unidos falló el caso Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) y dejó sin efecto el precedente establecido por casi un siglo en el caso Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911) en virtud del cual la fijación de precios mínimos para la reventa (retail price maintenance) era considerada una conducta ilegal per se por contravenir la sección 1 del Sherman Act. Desde entonces la doctrina ha producido abundante material que analiza los efectos de la decisión de la Corte Suprema que establece que las restricciones verticales de precios serán juzgados bajo la regla de la razonabilidad.

En el caso fallado la compañía Leegin se negó a vender sus productos a la firma PSKS, Inc. pues esta última revendía los productos por debajo de los precios sugeridos de Leegin. PSKS demandó a Leegin alegando, entre otros, que Leegin había realizado acuerdos verticales de precios con sus minoristas para fijar precios mínimos de reventa.

La Corte concluye que recientes estudios muestran que los acuerdos verticales, incluyendo los precios para la reventa, pueden tener efectos pro-competitivos. Cita como ejemplo el potencial de los acuerdos para incentivar la competencia entre-marcas (inter-brand). A pesar de que la Corte reconoce que existe el riesgo de que dichos acuerdos también tengan efectos restrictivos, , la Corte dispone que estas conductas no se ajustan a la categoría de las prohibiciones per se en la medida en que no puede afirmarse con certeza que siempre o casi siempre la fijación de precios mínimos para la reventa restringen la competencia y disminuyen la producción.

Las críticas han llegado desde diversos sectores. LANCE MCMILLIAN (John Marshall Law School - Atlanta) por ejemplo critica la decisión de la Corte desde el punto de vista de la teoría del estado pues afirma en su paper The Proper Role of Courts: Why the Supreme Court Got it Wrong in Leegin que la Corte violó el principio de separación de poderes en la medida en que el Congreso había acogido expresamente el precedente de Dr. Miles al expedir el Consumer Goods Pricing Act de1975 que considera ilegales los acuerdos de precios verticales.

En relación a la perspectiva europea, un buen artículo para conocer el enfoque que la UE le ha dado al tema de los acuerdos verticales es Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC (2007) de Ioannis Lianos (University College London - Faculty of Laws). Están por verse los efectos de este giro en el antitrust de Estados Unidos sobre las demás jurisdicciones del Mundo. Por lo pronto, recomiendo para la mayor comprensión de este polémico tema el ensayo Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The Strange Career of the Law of Resale Price Maintenance de LINO A. GRAGLIA (University of Texas at Austin School of Law ) en la cual se hace un detallado recuento del análisis de la fijación de precios para la reventa en Estados Unidos.